



SEPT 22 - 24, 2026 | NAIROBI, KENYA

Agent Governance

From Instructions to Enforcement



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Nine Months Apart. The Same Failure.

	Replit coding agent · July 2025	PocketOS coding agent · April 2026
INSTRUCTION	A code freeze: make no changes	Never run destructive commands without approval
ACCESS	Live production database, still reachable	A broad API token, found in an unrelated file
OUTCOME	Data deleted, then records and tests fabricated	Production database and backups deleted in nine seconds

The instruction was there. The access was real.

Prompts Guide Behavior.

External Policy Creates the Security Boundary.



The model recommends. The architecture decides.

ACME Bank: One Request

"I was charged a €2,400 early repayment fee in error. Please refund it."

TAKES THE REQUEST

Customer Support Agent

Reads the message and works out
what is needed



DOES THE ACCOUNT WORK

Account Assistant Agent

Executes the account operations



HOLDS THE TOOLS

Accounts MCP Server

Transactions, balances, fee
reversal

What stops this agent refunding €2,400 to anyone who asks?

Today, Nothing Is in the Way



Nothing in the agent's code prevents a call to the tool that moves money.

Govern the Agent Through Time

Three stages. One control plane underneath all of them.



Before Execution


Registration · Identity · Isolation

Everything later depends on work done before the first request.



1.1 Registration and Identity

An unregistered agent cannot be governed. Identity makes an agent addressable, not authorized.




Every governed agent starts in the registry. Anything outside it is shadow.



1.2 Isolation Matched to Risk

Choose the boundary by the risk, not by default.



During Execution

Every boundary the request crosses is governed.

Invocation · model access · tool access · access delegation · high-risk approval



Authorized does **NOT** means it is safe: real-time rules watch the whole run.


2.1 Invocation

The agent sits inside a network boundary. The API Gateway is its only way in.



2.2 Model Access

The AI Gateway is the only way out to a model. Every call passes through it, in both directions.




When a limit trips, the gateway returns a machine-readable reason, so the runtime stops rather than retries.



2.3 Tool Access

Permission is the overlap of three scopes, decided on every call.




Hiding a tool is not access control. Denied tools are also hidden, but every call is still decided at the gateway.




2.4 Access Delegation

Access is delegated, never inherited. Each hop can only narrow it.



2.5 Approval for High-Risk Actions

Permission to call a tool is not permission for every amount.



€40 duplicate card fee: every policy allows it, no person is asked, and the call goes straight on to the MCP server. The agent's task pauses only while a person decides.



After Execution


Evidence · Feedback loop

An audit trail captured at the boundaries, and a loop that tightens policy.



3.1 Evidence

Evidence is captured at the boundaries. Agent traces are observability, not proof.




Recall the opening: one agent fabricated its results, the other wrote a confession. Neither is evidence.



3.2 The Feedback Loop

Governance is an operating loop, not a one-time review.



Every budget needs an owner who can say whether the spend was justified.



From Architecture to Platform

Everything in the three stages ships in one offering: WSO2 Agent Manager.

WSO2 AGENT MANAGER

BEFORE EXECUTION

Registry and identity

Agent registration and lifecycle
Agent ID, through the identity layer
Environment sets the isolation tier

DURING EXECUTION

API Gateway

Every invocation, including agent calls

AI Gateway

LLM path: guardrails, masking, token and cost policy
MCP path: Agent ID and tool scopes

One gateway, two paths

AFTER EXECUTION


Observability and Eval

Traces across every step
Evaluators on every run

One control plane across all three stages: policy, suspension, evidence

The Same Request, Governed

What stops this agent refunding €2,400 to anyone who asks? Not a prompt.



Where This Gets Harder

THE STAGES HOLD. THE ENFORCEMENT POINTS MOVE.

01

Ambient agents

No customer, no token
Grants go stale while waiting
Fails silently, with nobody watching

02

Agent memory

Poisoned today, acts next week
Isolation between customers in the store
Erasing what was derived

03

Failure and rollback

Fail closed, not open
A retry is not exactly once
Compensate, because you cannot revert


STILL APPLIES

BEFORE EXECUTION

DURING EXECUTION

AFTER EXECUTION

Is Your Agent Instructed, or Genuinely Governed?



Prompts guide behavior.

Architecture constraints consequence.

Questions?

Explore the WSO2 Agent Platform at

<https://console.agent-manager.cloud.wso2.com/>

Repository

<https://github.com/wso2/agent-manager>



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Thank You!



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